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Abstract  
 
When dependent firms trade with one another, no usual market incentives apply to the pricing decision. Prices determined in such 
a case are called transfer prices. Global differences in corporate tax rates encourage multinational enterprises to manipulate their 
transfer prices to shift profits to avoid taxes. It is estimated that one third to over half of global trade value is between related 
parties, making potential tax gains large from transfer mispricing. Literature has proposed transfer mispricing to be one of the 
major channels for international profit shifting. 
 
This thesis examines whether transfer mispricing can be found in export prices of Finnish multinational enterprises. The data set is 
obtained by merging Finnish Customs data on International Trade in Goods in 2014-2017 and Statistics Finland Enterprise Group 
Register. By combining the two data sets, information on export prices on firm, product and destination level are tagged with 
information on dependencies in the destination country. This allows comparing intra-firm trade prices with independent trade 
prices. 
 
The model used to distinguish transfer mispricing is a fixed effects difference-in-differences regression, where differences in 
independent and dependent export prices are compared in their response to destination tax differences. Information on firm, 
product, export date and destination characteristics are used to control for differences between independent and dependent trade 
prices that are not explained by tax motivations. 
 
The results provide evidence of transfer mispricing in magnitude comparable to the previous research. A 10 percent decrease in 
destination tax rate is estimated to lead to 1.2 percent decrease in intra-firm export prices of Finnish multinational enterprises. This 
implies 0.8 billion euros of underreported exports in 2017, totaling 160 million euros of corporate tax losses. These results are 
questioned by using a more robust method than applied in previous empirical literature. According to the more conservative 
estimates, the main evidence of transfer mispricing loses statistical significance. 
 
The results give broad confidence intervals for transfer mispricing of Finnish multinational enterprises, which do not cancel out 
either large-scale profit shifting or nonexistent price manipulation. They encourage further research on the subject exploiting more 
detailed data on transaction level dependencies. In addition, the role of foreign affiliates in transfer mispricing calls for more 
detailed data. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Konsernien sisäisen kaupan hinnoittelu ei noudata tavanomaisia markkinaehtoisen kaupankäynnin kannustimia. Tällaista toisiinsa 
riippuvuussuhteessa olevien osapuolten kaupan hinnoittelua kutsutaan siirtohinnoitteluksi. Valtioidenväliset erot 
yhteisöverotuksessa kannustavat monikansallisia konserneja manipuloimaan siirtohintojaan veroja vältelläkseen. Koska 
konsernien sisäisen kaupan arvon on arvioitu kattavan kolmasosan tai jopa yli puolet maailmankaupan arvosta, siirtohinnoittelu 
muodostaa merkittävän kanavan voitonsiirrolle alemman verotuksen maihin. On arvioitu, että siirtohinnoittelu on suurimpia 
voitonsiirtokanavia globaalissa taloudessa. 
 
Tässä tutkielmassa on selvitetty, esiintyykö siirtohinnoittelua suomalaisten monikansallisten yritysten vientihinnoissa. Aineistona 
käytettiin Tullin tavaravientiaineistoja vuosilta 2014-2017 yhdistettynä Tilastokeskuksen konsernirekisteriaineistoon. Nämä kaksi 
aineistoa yhdistämällä saatiin selville, milloin vienti yrityksen, tuotteen, vientimaan ja vientikuukauden tarkkuudella kohdistuu 
maahan, jossa viejällä on tytäryhtiöitä. Tämä mahdollisti siirtohintojen vertaamisen vastaaviin markkinahintoihin. 
 
Mallina tutkimuksessa on käytetty difference-in-differences-regressiota kiinteillä vaikutuksilla. Mallissa verrataan siirtohintojen ja 
markkinahintojen eroja siinä, miten ne reagoivat veroasteen muutokseen viennin kohdemaassa samalla kontrolloiden muilla 
vientimaan ominaisuuksilla sekä yritysten, tuotetyyppien ja vientiajankohtien kiinteillä vaikutuksilla. 
 
Tulokset antavat samansuuntaisia arvioita veromotivoituneesta siirtohinnoittelusta kuin aikaisemmat tutkimukset. Kymmenen 
prosentin laskun kohdemaan veroasteessa arvioidaan johtavan 1,2 prosentin laskuun suomalaisten monikansallisten yritysten 
siirtohinnoissa. Tämä tarkoittaa, että Suomen viennin kokonaisarvosta vuonna 2017 uupuu 0,8 miljardia euroa siirtohinnoittelun 
vuoksi, mikä vastaa 160 miljoonaa euroa keräämättömiä yhteisöveroja. Tulokset eivät ole kuitenkaan tilastollisesti merkitseviä, kun 
menetelmässä poiketaan aikaisemman kirjallisuuden suosimasta mallista ja hyödynnetään tilastollisesti konservatiivisempaa tapaa 
parametrien estimoinnissa. 
 
Tulokset antavat viitteitä suomalaiskonsernien siirtohinnoittelusta, mutta laajojen luottamusvälien vuoksi ei mahdollisuutta 
siirtohinnoittelun olemattomaan rooliin verovälttelyssä eikä toisaalta sen laajamittaista hyödyntämistä voida kumota. 
Tulevaisuudessa tarkempia arvioita voidaan saavuttaa yksityiskohtaisemmalla tiedolla kauppatapahtumien riippuvuussuhteista. 
Myös ulkomaisten konsernien siirtohintojen tutkiminen edellyttää tarkempaa tietoa kaikkien Suomessa toimivien yritysten 
ulkomaankaupan riippuvuussuhteista. 
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1 Introduction
In the modern global economy with differing national tax regimes, multi-
nationally operating enterprises (MNE) have an incentive to shift profits to
low-tax countries to ease their total tax burden. Research has found vast
empirical evidence of profit shifting and identified multiple tools for MNEs
to shift their profits (Hines, 1999; Devereux et al., 2007; Dharmapala, 2014;
Beer et al., 2018). In addition to transfer mispricing, in which prices are
manipulated to shift income from one country to another, these include in-
ternational debt shifting (Huizinga et al., 2008; De Mooij, 2011), in which
MNEs create intra-company loans to restructure their global assets, strategic
location of intellectual property (Alstadsæter et al., 2018), tax treaty shop-
ping (Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2010), tax deferral (Egger, 2015; Hasegawa
and Kiyota, 2017), and inversion of headquarter location (Desai and Hines,
2002). The common feature for all profit shifting tools is that they exploit
MNE parent and subsidiaries being subject to host country taxation, which
exposes the MNE operations to multiple tax systems.
Profit shifting is an important policy theme due to its ability to distort
competition and erode tax base. MNEs gain advantage over domestic firms
while being able to shift their profits to low-tax countries, leading to unfair
competition and efficiency losses. As MNEs use their profit shifting toolbox
to ever lower their total tax load, governments are tempted to lower their
corporate tax rates in order to keep companies and their taxable profits in
their home country (Devereux et al., 2002; Devereux and Loretz, 2012). Due
to such efforts to attract MNEs, corporate tax rates fall to a level lower than
they would otherwise be, harming public finance and pushing more pressure
on other taxable sources. OECD (2015) estimates suggest that corporate
profit shifting reduces corporate tax revenue by 4-10%. Finke (2013) suggests
that affiliates of MNEs pay 27% less taxes than comparable domestic firms in
Germany, and Habu (2017) estimates that taxable income of foreign affiliates
in the UK are 12.8% lower than for comparable domestic firms.
The focus of this thesis is on transfer mispricing and its specific effects as a
profit shifting tool. Transfer mispricing occurs when two firms within a multi-
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national enterprise (MNE) trade with one another and determine trade prices
outside the usual market conditions. The necessary condition for market price
determination is that buyers and sellers are independent of each other, but
in case of dependent firms, the pricing decision is mostly arbitrary or reg-
ulated to imitate market prices. However, when it comes to international
trade, the dependent firms have an incentive to deviate from market prices
to avoid taxes. This can manifest in MNEs trading goods at a lower price
to a country with a lower tax rate, or vice versa, to transfer MNE profits to
the country with the lower tax rate. Transfer mispricing occurs when MNEs
deviate from the market price and decide their transfer prices to optimize
profits with respect to taxes.
Economics literature has identified transfer mispricing as an important
tool for international tax avoidance. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) run
a meta-analysis of the accumulated research and estimate that up to 70% of
profit shifting is conducted via transfer mispicing. One of the reasons transfer
mispricing is such a powerful profit shifting tool is the sheer amount of intra-
firm transactions of the total international trade volumes. Clausing (2003)
suggests that 40% of US international trade is intra-firm trade and according
to Davies et al. (2018), over 50% of MNE international trade value in France
in 1999 was intra-firm. IMF (2009) estimates that 30 to 40% of total world
trade is between related parties.
Due to the vast share of intra-firm trade in international trade, transfer
mispricing not only impacts on tax base and competition. It is also sug-
gested that transfer mispricing affects trade statistics and national account-
ing, such as trade deficits via biasing export and import volumes and prices.
Vicard (2015), using French 2008 trade data, estimates that transfer mispric-
ing caused export value to decrease 0.8% and import value to increase 0.5%,
causing the trade deficit to worsen by 9.7%. Other empirical papers have also
estimated similar trade deficit bias caused by transfer mispricing (Cristea and
Nguyen, 2016; Davies et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017). Solutions have been devel-
oped to calculate more reliable export and import price indexes from transfer
prices to tackle bias in economic measures (IMF, 2009; Diewert et al., 2005)
and to regulate multinational pricing strategies to diminish their biasing ef-
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fect on national accounts (OECD, 2017). Global efforts in managing transfer
mispricing have been developed during the last decade, such as OECD Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting package (OECD, 2015), which presents tools for
governments to deal with profit shifting. Efforts to tackle transfer pricing
have been found effective. Riedel et al. (2015) show that introduction of
transfer pricing rules can decrease corporate profit tax sensitivity by 50%.
The evidence on transfer mispricing have been obtained either indirectly
by analysing profit shifting in general or directly by analysing prices them-
selves. The direct evidence has been acquired by testing whether MNEs ma-
nipulate their intra-firm export and import prices according to the countries’
relative tax rates. These analyses rely on large data sets containing detailed
information on export and import prices grouped by product types, destina-
tion countries and individual firms. Large and detailed data sets are needed,
since a number of different factors affecting pricing decisions must be con-
trolled for, such as product quality, firm characteristics and market conditions.
Failing to identify all the factors affecting pricing decisions risk the reliabil-
ity of results, putting a lot of pressure on data selection and econometric
methods.
While empirical research has been conducted on transfer mispricing in
countries such as the US (Clausing, 2003; Bernard et al., 2006; Flaaen, 2017),
France (Davies et al. 2018; Vicard, 2015), Germany (Overesch, 2006; Hebous
and Johannesen, 2016) and Denmark (Cristea and Nguyen, 2016), no similar
analysis has yet been made for MNEs operating in Finland. This research
aims to fill the gap and provide an empirical estimate of transfer mispricing
in Finland using a detailed export data set and the methods presented in
previous literature to distinguish the effects of transfer mispricing on Finnish
exports. Given the varying tax systems, regulatory schemes and international
trade profiles of different countries, empirical results are hard to generalize
over countries and time periods. Therefore, to understand transfer mispricing
in Finland and patterns of profit shifting, it is important to have an analysis
performed with Finnish data.
In Chapter 2, I present theory on transfer pricing and present empirical
literature that has tried to estimate the magnitude of price manipulation.
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In Chapter 3, characteristics of the Finnish tax system are presented, and
in Chapter 4, the data sets used in this research are described. In Chapter
5, I present methods applied to the data set, results of which are reported
in Chapter 6. As a conclusion, these results are examined more carefully in
Chapters 7 and 8, presenting the final conclusions of the research.
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2 Theory and Literature
In this section, I will go through the theoretical motivation for transfer mis-
pricing and provide literature review on empirical research conducted to esti-
mate the effects of transfer mispricing and its magnitude in real economies.
Throughout this paper, I use the term “transfer pricing” to refer to pricing
which involves dependent parties, and “transfer mispricing” as the special case
in which such pricing also facilitates profit shifting. Distinguishing the two is
important because transfer pricing does not necessarily imply profit shifting,
and confusing the two concepts may lead to misunderstanding. Eventually,
pricing between dependent parties is a necessary and legal practice facilitating
the movement of goods and services within MNEs or dependent domestic
firms, for example as part of a production chain. Transfer pricing is thus
a theoretical concept encompassing various firm behavioral aspects, other
than just profit shifting incentives, and a practice deeply embedded in the
institutional structure of international and domestic trade (Göx and Schiller,
2006). In this framework, transfer mispricing can be seen as a special case
of transfer pricing, arising from a systemic failure to regulate unwanted firm
behaviour and providing firms with a channel for profit shifting.
Not all literature does such conceptual distinction, but may use the term
“transfer pricing” to represent both intra-firm pricing in general and profit
shifting activity. However, I follow De Mooij (2011) and Beer et al. (2018) to
better distinguish these two.
2.1 Transfer pricing as opposed to market pricing
Transfer pricing is defined as pricing occurring between related parties, such
as two separate firms that are part of the same corporate. The differences in
transfer pricing and regular market pricing arise when the trading partners
do not fulfill the condition of independence. The basic microeconomic theory
suggests that when independent buyers and sellers meet in the marketplace,
the price is set for both parties to gain utility in the transaction. This applies
whether the market is competitive, monopolistic or oligopolistic, revealing
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information about the preferences of each buyer or seller taking part in the
transaction, and about costs, value added, productivity and profitability of
each independent agent.
The standard microeconomic pricing theory illustrates the price setting
case when each party is independent of each other. The outcome price of such
a scenario can be called “an arm’s-length price”. However, when the condition
of independence is eased, it can be seen that the pricing decision becomes
arbitrary. When the corporate profits are summed up, the costs and profits
of an internal transaction between two related firms cancel out, no matter
what price is used in the transaction, leaving no economic incentive for the
pricing decision (Diewert et al., 2005). However, economic transfer pricing can
lead to efficiency gains for large companies, and extensive literature exists for
decentralized decision making in organizational economics (e.g. Hirshleifer,
1956).
2.1.1 International case with differing corporate income taxes
When the two dependent trade partners situate in different countries, a set
of restricting conditions start applying to the otherwise arbitrary pricing de-
cision. The corporate income taxes in the two countries can be different,
which gives an incentive to the MNE to choose the price so that profits are
transferred to the country with the lower tax rate (Kant, 1988; Horst, 1971).
Following the paper of Clausing (2003), the profit functions for the two firms
in different countries can be defined as:
pi1 =R1(s1)− C1(s1 +m) + pm (1)
pi2 =R2(s2)− C2(s2 −m)− pm (2)
where pi is the firm revenue, R the revenue as a function of sales s in the
home country and C the costs as a function of production. Additionally, the
profit is determined by the sales to the foreign affiliate m and the price p
assigned to these foreign sales. In these equations, p represents the transfer
price, which multiplied by the quantity of sales m depicts the income shifted
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from firm to another as a result of internal transactions. When introduced
with firm income tax rates, the total after-tax profit of the MNE can be
illustrated as:
pi = (1− t1)pi1 + (1− t2)pi2 (3)
where ti is the income tax rate in country i. To maximize this total after-
tax profit, the MNE optimizes with respect to transfer price p. This can
be achieved by taking the first derivative of the total profit with respect to
transfer price p:
pip = (1− t1)m− (1− t2)m (4)
= −(t1 − t2)m
Thus when t1 > t2, pip < 0 and the corporate maximizes its profits by
setting the transfer price as close to zero as possible (when assumed that
negative prices are not feasible). Vice versa, when t1 < t2, pip > 0 and the
corporate maximizes its profits by setting the price as high as possible, but
as noticed by Bernard et al. (2006), limited with the condition that taxable
income stays positive also for the firm in the high-tax country (p −→ p∗, where
p∗ is the price that sets pi2 in equation (2) to zero). As Beer et al. (2018) em-
phasise, this concept of separate accounting, in which individual subsidiaries
are subject to different tax treatment, is the basis for all international profit
shifting and also forms the incentive for transfer mispricing.
2.1.2 Cost component of transfer mispricing
For the tax collecting authorities, the former example provides worrying re-
sults. In a situation with no government regulation, internationally operating
firms are best off by pricing all their profits into the low-taxing countries,
thus eroding the taxable income for high-taxing countries and encouraging
unhealthy tax competition. To ensure that the MNEs pay their taxes in
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countries where the additional value is actually created, it is often expected
of them to set their transfer prices to imitate the arm’s-length prices, which
is referred to as the arm’s-length principle (OECD, 2017). The regulatory
authority can sanction the corporate for prices that differ remarkably from
the referenced arm’s-length prices, creating a cost component to the corporate
profit function (Kant, 1988). This type of “transfer mispricing concealment
cost” is adopted in most empirical papers. Davies et al. (2018) format this
cost component as follows:
C = f [|p− p∗|] = γ2 (p− p
∗)2 + µ, if p 6= p∗ (5)
= 0, if p = p∗
where γ reflects the strictness of the country on transfer price rules, µ
is a fixed cost component that is always present when transfer mispricing is
practiced, p is the transfer price that the corporate chooses, and p∗ is the
comparable arm’s-length price. In this equation, it can be seen that the cost
of transfer mispricing is the greater the more the corporate chooses to deviate
from the arm’s-length price and the stricter the government is to punish when
it observes deviations from the arm’s-length prices. Inserting this cost term
into the profit function (eq. 3) yields
pi = (1− t1)pi1 + (1− t2)pi2 − f [|p− p∗|] (6)
Here it can be seen that deviating from the arm’s-length price makes the
corporate better off only when there is enough trade volume, tax difference
and price difference to compensate the concealment cost, and additionally, to
compensate the risk of being caught by the regulatory authority. Davies et
al. (2018) suggest that this theoretical formulation creates a band of inaction,
which makes deviating from the arm’s-length prices profitable only for big
firms exporting and importing sufficiently large quantities to countries with
significantly lower tax rate.
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2.1.3 Problems in the arm’s-length principle
There are problems when using the arm’s-length principle to evaluate the
comparable market price for the traded goods. Obviously, not all intra-firm
transactions have a clear reference price in the free market, since similar inde-
pendent trade might not be observed between the same countries, same prod-
ucts and similar firms (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Beer et al., 2018).
Bernard et al. (2006) analyze the US export price differences by firm de-
pendency status by tagging each intra-firm transaction with a “comparable
uncontrolled price”, defined by the US tax code and OECD tax guidelines
(for an updated version, see OECD (2017)), ending up only finding a suffi-
cient comparable uncontrolled price for one third of the transfer prices. This
means that for two thirds of the intra-firm transactions in their customs export
and import data, an estimate for the comparable uncontrolled price cannot
be assigned. One of the biggest problems in defining comparable uncontrolled
prices is product differentiation, which ensures that for many products there
are no arm’s-length prices, since in practice, there is only one firm producing
and trading on a certain type of good.
To estimate a reference price for those goods that cannot be assigned
an arm’s-length comparable uncontrolled price, a cost-plus method can be
used. As a rule of thumb, a cost-plus method uses information on costs of
trading partners to deduce what is the price for the transaction that leaves
both firms with a theoretical surplus in the transaction (Diewert et al., 2005).
However, relying on multiple methods to determine acceptable prices for intra-
firm transactions leads to an even wider spectrum of plausible and legitimate
transfer prices for MNEs to apply, which allows them to choose the most
suitable one for taxation purposes (Davies et al., 2018).
As shown by Cristea and Nguyen (2016), the MNE facing an arm’s-length
principle restriction on its pricing decisions may also have an incentive to
manipulate its arm’s-length prices. This creates another obstacle when using
the arm’s-length principle to solve for the reference price for the intra-firm
transaction, since even the reference price can be subject to manipulation.
However, such a practice creates an additional cost for the firm since manip-
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ulating its trade prices with unrelated parties may mean increased losses in
its market-based trade. For example, when manipulating export prices to a
low-tax country, the firm should decrease its prices for the independent firms,
thus deviating from the optimum and losing in these transactions. Therefore,
the total volume of the intra-firm trade must be large enough compared to
the independent trade for this practice to be profitable.
Due to the problems in the arm’s-length principle, estimating the mag-
nitude of transfer mispricing is also a difficult task requiring a lot from the
identification applied in the empirical research. The most obvious difficulty
concerns the lack of reference prices, but on top of that, arm’s-length price
manipulation further erodes the credibility of comparing arm’s-length prices
to intra-firm prices. Even if there is a risk of arm’s-length price manipulations,
many of the earlier empirical papers, such as Clausing (2003) and Bernard et
al. (2006), assume that MNEs do not have the power to manipulate arm’s-
length prices, or they do not take the possibility of arm’s-length manipulation
into account at all.
2.2 Empirical studies
In this section, I will go through the empirical research that have been made
to explore whether transfer mispricing can be found in real world data and
to calculate the magnitude of transfer mispricing in real economies. Various
methods have been used to distinguish transfer pricing from market pricing
and their potential differences, but mostly large micro-data sets have been
involved. This has been necessary, since to differentiate transfer pricing from
arm’s-length pricing, one needs to have information on the firm level to iden-
tify the dependencies of the trading parties, as well as detailed information
on good quality and destination, since controlling for the product type and
market characteristics is essential when comparing prices of independent and
dependent transactions.
Most of the research available finds statistically significant evidence on
transfer mispricing. This might be due to publication bias, although when
reflecting on the theoretical basis of transfer mispricing, there are clear reasons
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to expect transfer mispricing occurring in real economies. The estimated
elasticity of transfer pricing on tax differences between trading countries varies
from 0.5 to 6, which Beer et al. (2018) suggest might be due to differences
between countries, firms and sectors studied, as well as the data and the
methods used.
2.2.1 The basic model for analyzing transfer pricing
Clausing (2003) is one of the most cited empirical papers on the effects of
tax differences on transfer pricing. Her work relies on US price index data,
which consists of a representative sample of international trade prices in the
US gathered by Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1997-1999. In this data set,
each price is tagged with information on country of export or import, good
type and if the trade is between related parties or not. These price data are
then formatted into a regression model, in which log price is explained by a
dummy of intra-firm trade adjusted by exporting or importing country tax
rate. The full regression model is:
ln(Priceit) = α + β1 ln(1− Tax rateky) (7)
+ β2 ln(1− Tax rateky)× Intrafirm dummyit
+ β3 ln(Exchange rate indexkt)
+ β4 ln(Exchange rate indexkt)× Intrafirm dummyit
+ β5Intrafirm dummyit + β6Inputeit
+ β7Linkit + β8No dollarit + βzIndustry dummies + vit
where i indicates individual products, k countries, t month of observation
and y year of observation. The variables “inpute” and “link” refer to whether
the price has been inputed or estimated as a link price, since the data set is
used for calculating price indexes and thus includes instrumental observations
to deal with missing observations. The industry dummies are used to control
for different industry categories. The main interest lies in coefficient β2, which
is expected to be negative for exports and positive for imports if verifying the
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existence of destination tax rate differences on transfer prices. In addition to
this basic model, Clausing uses GDP and GDP per capita to control for income
differences between countries, which account for differing market conditions
across countries. As a result, Clausing finds that a 1% lower or higher tax
rate in a country is associated with as much as 1.8% lower intra-firm export
prices and 2.0% higher intra-firm import prices relative to the arm’s-length
prices.
The model is analogous to the more common difference-in-differences model,
which uses panel data to isolate impacts of a treatment from other time-
dependent changes in variables (see e.g. Card and Krueger, 1994). In the
most simple setting, treatment and control group are measured before and
after the treatment, so that the common time-dependent trend can be omit-
ted from the estimate of the treatment impact. By replacing treatment with
intra-firm dummy and time variable with tax rate, it can be noticed that such
a model looks very similar to the one applied by Clausing (2003):
Y = α0 + α1 × Tax rate + α2 × Intrafirm dummy (8)
+ α3 × Tax rate× Intrafirm dummy + 
where Tax rate = ln(1 − Tax rateky). To interpret this simplified version
of the full regression model, it is useful to consider the two differences forming
the core of interest: difference in prices caused by tax rate, and difference in
prices caused by export mode, i.e. whether price is arm’s-length or intra-
firm. To come to the conclusion that intra-firm export prices are smaller
than arm’s-length prices for lower tax rate countries, one needs to control
for arm’s-length prices depending on tax rates and intra-firm price differences
from arm’s-length prices. The cross term of intra-firm dummy and tax rate
then isolates the difference of the two price groups in the way they depend on
the tax rate variable.
Bernard et al. (2006) employ an analysis similar to Clausing (2003) on the
US customs bureau data on exports for years 1993-2000, using a tight pairing
of intra-firm and reference prices called “price wedges” as the regressand in the
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model. The study finds that 1 percentage point decrease in corporate tax rate
or increase in tariff increases the price wedge between related-party and arm’s-
length prices by 0.56 to 0.66 percentage points. The paper also concludes that
the price wedge depends positively on firm size and export volume, which are
also conclusions in later research (Davies et al., 2018). Even if the paper is
not published in an academic journal, its empirical analysis using customs
data is later replicated and modified in further papers (Cristea and Nguyen,
2016; Davies et al., 2018). Flaaen (2017) explores transfer pricing in the US
by investigating the case of “one-time dividend repatriation tax holiday”. The
paper concludes that when comparing pre and post-tax holiday transfer prices,
strategic transfer mispricing can be observed in the US multinationals trading
internationally. Flaaen (2017) modifies the difference-in-difference model by
Bernard et al. (2006) to explore the variance in price wedges before and after
the tax repatriation holiday relative to differing tax rates across export and
import countries.
2.2.2 The triple-difference method
Cristea and Nguyen (2016) develop further the empirical methods developed
by Clausing (2003) and Bernard et al. (2006) by taking into account that the
MNEs involving in strategic transfer mispricing tend to also manipulate their
arm’s-length prices to make their pricing decisions appear more in tune with
the arm’s-length principle imposed by the tax authorities. Whereas Bernard
et al. (2006) identified transfer mispricing by price wedges with an intra-price
and an arm’s-length price of the same firm, good and country, Cristea and
Nguyen (2016) argue that such identification underestimates the volume of
transfer mispricing, because the closest arm’s-length reference price is subject
to manipulation by MNEs to cover their tax avoiding behaviour. They sug-
gest an alternative strategy to better isolate the volume of strategic transfer
mispricing by using a triple-difference method, which exploits the temporal
variation of firm dependencies. By comparing the prices before and after
an MNE has established an affiliate to a country, another layer to the basic
difference-in-differences model can be added, which removes the biasing effect
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caused by arm’s-length manipulation. Cristea and Nguyen (2016) find that
MNEs in Denmark in 1999-2006 reduce their intra-firm export unit values by
5.7 to 9.1 percent to low-tax countries, suggesting transfer price manipulation
to avoid taxes.
Even if Cristea and Nguyen (2016) use a more sophisticated method to
distinguish arm’s-length price manipulation, they do not identify accurately
the true intra-firm trade from the independent trade in the Danish customs
data set in use. The same method of using affiliate geographic information as
a proxy for intra-firm trade is used by Vicard (2015), Hebous and Johannesen
(2016) and Liu et al. (2017). However, Davies et al. (2018) criticize such
an approach by showing that there is significant variation of intra-firm and
independent trade volumes in countries where the firm has an affiliate. They
argue that by neglecting the accurate identification of transaction dependen-
cies, Cristea and Nguyen (2016) risk failing to obtain an accurate estimate for
the magnitude of transfer mispricing. However, their analysis on the effects
of establishing an affiliate on transfer mispricing is unique, and using data on
Denmark gives rare evidence on transfer mispricing in a small open economy.
2.2.3 Recent developments in methods and further results
Most recent of the empirical papers studying transfer mispricing is by Davies
et al. (2018) which concentrates on identifying tax-avoiding component in
French transfer prices with a detailed data set combining French customs data
on exports and imports, a survey on foreign activities of French MNEs, a firm-
level data set on financial linkages between French firms and the effective tax
rates and tariff information facing French exporters. By combining all the
above data sets, Davies et al. (2018) are able to tag the totality of French
exports and their prices with information on their dependency status for 1999,
creating a unique data set for investigating transfer pricing behaviour. By also
taking into account the manipulation of arm’s-length prices, as suggested by
Cristea and Nguyen (2016), but with a less complicated method, Davies et al.
(2018) are able to isolate the tax-avoiding component in transfer prices. The
idea is that prices are not compared within the same firm, product and country
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by tight pairing of intra-firm and arm’s-length prices, as done by Bernard et
al. (2006), but rather within same firm and product across countries with
differing tax rates. Davies et al. (2018) also investigate tax haven status
effects on transfer price manipulation.
As a result, Davies et al. (2018) find that tax-avoiding transfer mispricing
is primarily found in only a small number of large MNEs. Additionally, tax-
avoiding behaviour is concentrated in tax havens, with no evidence of tax
avoidance if they are disregarded. Intra-firm export prices are 10.4% lower
than the market prices in tax havens, indicating that French MNEs exported
with an underpriced value of 1 billion euros less due to tax avoiding purposes.
Using the UK export data from 2005-2011 and similar empirical methods,
Liu et al. (2017) find that a 1 percentage point lower tax rate decreases intra-
firm export prices by 3% compared to arm’s-length prices. Opposite to the
results of Davies et al. (2018), they find that most transfer mispricing takes
place in non-tax haven countries, which is explained to be possibly caused
by the small amount of UK trade to these countries. In addition, transfer
mispricing is suggested to depend on the firm’s R&D intensity, and it is found
to react strongly to the UK policy shift from a worldwide to a territorial tax
system. In total, 2010 export value is estimated to be underreported as much
as £600 million.
Vicard (2015) exploits panel data from France in 2000, 2007-2009 and
2014 and finds similar systematic evidence for French transfer mispricing as
Davies et al. (2018). However, he finds underreported taxable income on
both exports and imports to be even higher, up to 8 billion euros in 2008.
Hebous and Johannesen (2016) find evidence on transfer mispricing in
German service trade, including intellectual property, headquarter services
and sea transport. Evidence on transfer mispricing in service trade is scarce,
even if the arm’s-length principle is even less applicable for controlling transfer
mispricing in services than goods, suggesting a more pronounced effect of
transfer mispricing via services. The paper reminds that other studies so far
have only identified transfer mispricing in trade of goods, which disregards
the vast possibilities for profit shifting by international service trade.
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2.2.4 Effects on economic measures
In addition to finding evidence on profit shifting via transfer mispricing, the
results of empirical research on transfer mispricing have a wide range of ef-
fects on multiple economic measures that are of interest to researchers and
policymakers. The usual conclusion in empirical transfer mispricing literature
is that total export values are lower and import prices higher than they would
be without transfer mispricing. Such results are calculated simply by multi-
plying the estimate for elasticity of intra-firm prices with total exports per
country and their tax differences (Liu et al., 2017; Vicard, 2015). This gives
the amount of income shifted given the parameter of intra-firm price elastic-
ity on tax difference. Ever further calculations can be made to solve for the
corporate tax losses from this estimate of underreported corporate income.
Decreased export value and increased import value lead to a number of
further conclusions. Vicard (2015) states that such biased statistics worsen
trade deficits. Profit shifting in general is observed to understate value added
in high-taxing countries, which leads to underestimating total GDP (Seppälä
et al., 2014; Maffini and Mokkas, 2011; Bruner et al., 2018). Guvenen et al.,
(2017) argue that whenever profit shifting increases, even GDP growth gets
underestimated, which originates from domestic productivity growth increas-
ingly calculated as foreign rather than domestic income.
Export and import price indexes are also considered to have an impact by
transfer mispricing. Eden (2001) defines use of transfer prices in calculating
export and import prices as essential, since almost half of US international
trade is intra-firm, and thus excluding transfer prices would lead to overes-
timating the share of small exporters and importers in calculated indexes.
Diewert et al. (2005) propose not to use transfer prices in constructing ex-
port and import price indexes, but instead prices of comparable arm’s-length
transactions. This policy is also encouraged by IMF Export and Import Price
Index Manual (IMF, 2009) in the limits of its practical applicability and ad-
ministrative costs to the statistical agencies.
Neiman (2010) challenges the view that international transfer prices are
primarily driven by profit shifting motives. Using time-series data on intra-
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firm prices, Neiman (2010) concludes that they are less sticky, less synchro-
nized and exhibit greater exchange rate pass-through than arm’s-length prices.
According to Neiman (2010), there is evidence that intra-firm prices convey
mainly economic information about MNE costs and profitability beyond being
mere accounting constructs and means to profit shifting. In order to under-
stand the effects of transfer mispricing on economic measures discussed above,
investigating their temporal behavior is argued to be necessary.
2.2.5 Transfer price regulation and its possible pitfalls
Transfer price regulation has drawn increasing attention by policy makers
during the last decades, and recent efforts to restrict MNE profit shifting have
been presented by national governments, OECD (2015) and the European
Comission (2018). One of the central tools to tackle profit shifting by transfer
mispricing has been the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD, 2017),
which is used around the world as a transfer price regulation standard.
While the aim of transfer price regulation is to hinder profit shifting, it also
has impacts on firm behavior and economy that exceed the original purpose.
IMF (2009) warns that transfer price regulation puts pressure on MNEs to rely
on legal consulting in navigating domestic and foreign regulations, increasing
the cost of international trade. Behrens et al. (2014) study firm behaviour
under transfer price regulation by arm’s-length principle and present a the-
oretical model in which multinationals choose their organisational structure
according to the government transfer mispricing strictness, relying more on
foreign affiliates when restrictions are relaxed compared to relying on foreign
independent distributors when restrictions are strict. Keuschnigg and Dev-
ereux (2013) use a similar kind of simulation model to evaluate the effects
of transfer pricing rules on the economy, suggesting that transfer price reg-
ulation by arm’s length-principle creates global welfare losses by preventing
multinationals to choose pricing strategies that match financial market im-
perfections. De Mooij and Liu (2020) find that MNEs decrease investment
after introducing transfer price regulation. These papers show the difficulties
of efficient transfer pricing regulation and examples of how transfer pricing
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and its regulation can have an adverse impact on the economy.
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3 Finnish Institutions
To further specify the incentives faced by MNEs operating in Finland, it is
necessary to explore the characteristics of Finnish corporate tax system in re-
lation to the international patterns of profit shifting. When analysing effects
of profit shifting on a country, individual characteristics of the tax system
need to be addressed to uncover what are the main drivers of profit shifting
activity, and what kind of legislation applies to MNEs operating in that par-
ticular country (Dharmapala, 2016). Differences in tax systems complicate
comparing results for different countries with similar research methods, and
it is logical to assume that various institutional and structural differences, as
well as differences in the composition of international trade, form the basis for
why different magnitudes of transfer mispricing are observed across countries.
Two main types of corporate tax systems can be identified as territorial
and worldwide systems (Beer et al., 2018). In a territorial system, foreign
earnings of MNEs are exempted in the residence country taxation, so that
only income in the source country is classified as taxable income. The world-
wide system, on the other hand, considers income from all countries subject
to home country taxation. Davies et al. (2018) argue, that a territorial tax
regime provides a simpler mapping between a tax differential and transfer
mispricing incentives as compared to the worldwide system, because in the
latter, even the income acquired in a third country unrelated to the trans-
action may complicate tax incentives in a single export transaction. This
happens because income from all countries the MNE has activities in are
aggregated to a single taxable income basket, which limits possibility for sep-
arate accounting. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) have employed a model taking
complex geographic patterns into account when estimating profit shifting pat-
terns. However, their analysis concentrates on profit shifting in general rather
than the role of transfer pricing as a profit shifting tool.
Despite worldwide tax systems in the US and, until recently, in the UK,
research using data for them have found evidence on transfer mispricing (e.g.
Bernard et al., 2006, Liu et al., 2017). However, Liu et al. (2017) find that the
UK tax reform from a worldwide to a territorial tax system in 2009 increased
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observed transfer mispricing. This would indicate that territorial tax system
indeed gives more incentive to transfer mispricing, as also suggested by Markle
(2016).
Finland has characteristics of a worldwide tax system, since in principle,
MNEs need to pay taxes for income on both Finnish and foreign sources
(Verohallinto, 2019). This is also elaborated by Finnish Ministry of Finance,
which states that “companies with unlimited tax liability in Finland are liable
for tax on all of their income, regardless whether the income is received from
Finland or another country” (Ministry of Finance, 2020). However, Finland is
usually categorized as belonging to the group of territorial taxation (Matheson
et al., 2013), which may be a result of the fact that the two categories are
not clear-cut (Beer et al., 2018), and that in practice, taxation would in effect
be similar to that in other territorial tax system countries. If not, transfer
mispricing incentives could be expected to be milder for MNEs operating in
Finland as compared to countries previously researched with territorial tax
system.
Figure 1: Effective average tax rate per country. More details on tax rates in
the Appendix (Table A2). Source: OECD Corporate Tax Database
A substantial decrease in corporate tax rate took place in Finland in 2014
lowering the corporate tax rate from 24% to20%. Due to this policy change,
profit shifting from Finland could be assumed to have become less attractive
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Figure 2: Effective marginal tax rate per country. Full list of tax rates in the
Appendix (Table A2). Source: OECD Corporate Tax Database
in recent years compared to before the tax decrease. According to the OECD
tax database, the effective average tax rate (EATR) of Finland at 19% was
slightly below the sample median of 22%, which makes Finland a country of
relatively moderate corporate taxes in 2017 (Figure 1). However, the effective
marginal tax rate (EMTR) for Finland at 11.4%, another OECD measure for
taxes faced by MNEs, is slightly above the sample median of 9.5% in 2017
(Figure 2). The moderate tax rates of MNEs in Finland can be compared
to those of Denmark in the research by Cristea and Nguyen (2016), which
found evidence of tax evasion by transfer mispricing despite moderate tax
rates in Denmark. The worldwide characteristics of the Finnish tax regime
and moderate corporate tax rate need to be taken into consideration when
formatting the analysis on transfer mispricing and later when interpreting the
results.
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4 Data
4.1 Export data and data on firm dependencies
The data used consists of two separate tables by Statistics Finland and Finnish
Customs. The Finnish Customs data includes information on total exports
from Finland, categorized by exporting firm, export country and CN8 product
type code, divided for each month 2014/1-2017/12. The Statistics Finland
data, on the other hand, provides information on the dependencies of Finnish
firms domestically and abroad. These two data sets are combined to recover
the geographical distribution for each Finnish enterprise and to tag trade flows
according to the information on geographical dependencies.
In an ideal setting, each transaction in the customs data could be given an
accurate information on its export mode – in other words, whether the trans-
action takes part arm’s-length or intra-firm. Such an identification method
has been used by Davies et al. (2018) using a similar customs data for France
in 1999, merging accurate information on export mode from a unique and
extensive survey conducted on French MNEs for one year only. However,
equivalent information for Finnish MNEs is not available and, therefore, MNE
geographical structure is used as an approximate on the export mode, as in
papers by Liu et al. (2017), Vicard (2015) and Cristea and Nguyen (2016).
The identification of export mode is clearly inaccurate using only the MNE
geographical location information, since not all trade flows to countries where
the firm has dependencies is intra-firm in nature. Despite its clear weakness
in identifying intra-firm trade, the strength of the identification strategy em-
ployed lies in its ability to be accurate on defining the control group, which
comprises only of arm’s-length trade: since the arm’s-length group includes
only trade to countries were the firm has no dependencies, no intra-firm trans-
actions are mistakenly allocated to this group.
To ensure that the control group of arm’s-length trade does not have any
intra-firm transactions, the foreign-owned MNEs need to be dropped out of
the data set, for their complete corporate structure cannot be revealed using
the data set on firm dependencies. The Statistics Finland data set on depen-
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dencies of the Finnish firms has information on the nationality of the final
parent company, revealing some information of the geographical structure of a
foreign affiliate in Finland. However, since all other branches and nationalities
under the parent company cannot be identified, the information on MNE’s
geographical structure remains largely unknown. The motivation to keep the
control group of arm’s-length trade clear of intra-firm transactions encourages
to concentrate on Finnish-owned firms only, since their entire global structure
can be tracked using the Statistics Finland data on Finnish foreign affiliates.
Unfortunately, applying such a restriction implies that no conclusions can be
made on transfer mispricing practiced by foreign-owned MNEs in Finland.
As an indicator that the intra-firm transactions for foreign MNEs may
be misidentified, there are vast differences in shares of intra-group trade for
foreign and Finnish MNEs. Of total price observations for foreign MNEs,
only 15.2% are allocated into the intra-group, whereas the same proportion
for Finnish MNEs is 34.5%. The difference is even more pronounced when
comparing the share of intra-group trade value of total value of exports, which
for foreign MNEs is 21.4% and for Finnish MNEs almost three times more at
59.1%. These observations would indicate that the intra-firm transactions for
foreign MNEs are largely misspecified into the control group of arm’s-length
trade, encouraging to concentrate solely on data for Finnish MNEs. However,
when interpreting these proportions, it is important to keep in mind that the
intra-group trades are not necessarily real intra-firm transactions, but also
include trade to a third party to a country where the MNE has an affiliate.
Therefore, the intra-group share of Finnish MNE exports is overestimating
the true volume of intra-firm trade. On the contrary, the control group for
Finnish MNEs does not include any intra-firm trade.
To further modify the data set, state-owned firms are excluded, since their
pricing strategies may substantially differ from private firms (Davies et al.,
2018). The exports of these firms account for 0.9% of the total value of Finnish
exports.
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4.2 Country-specific variables
As the two main data sets described above are combined, we are given a
table of unit price per firm, CN8 product type, country of export and a
variable indicating if the transaction belongs to the arm’s-length or the intra-
firm group as defined previously. Additional country-specific information on
GDP per capita, country distance from Finland in kilometers, tariffs, tax
haven status and corporate income tax rates can be merged into the data set
using the information on the export destination available for each transaction.
These country-specific variables are used to control for variations in prices
that are related to different market conditions and institutional structures in
export countries. The tax rate can be used to distinguish whether differences
in arm’s-length and intra-firm prices are systematically related to lower tax
levels. The relation between different tax regimes and differences between
arm’s-length and intra-firm prices is of main interest in later analysis to study
if systematic transfer mispricing exists or not.
Information on GDP per capita in US dollars and current prices is ob-
tained from IMF database (IMF, 2020). It is used to estimate the impact
of the relative wealth of the export country on export prices. As a general
assumption, export prices are expected to be lower to countries with a lower
GDP per capita, even within the same product category. A similar assump-
tion can be made of the export country distance from Finland, obtained from
CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago, 2006), considering that the greater dis-
tance the good needs to travel, the larger the transportation costs and thus
export prices.
There are various alternatives that can be used as a proxy for tax costs
faced by MNEs in different countries. In reality, the true tax costs in a coun-
try for each industry and firm differ depending on various aspects, such as
production structure, the universe of tax rules and legislation in a country.
Therefore, using a single variable to describe the entire set of tax incentives in
a country for each firm can only capture a portion of the real tax incentives in
action. To follow the research made by Davies et al. (2018), effective marginal
tax rate (EMTR) provided by the OECD Corporate Tax Statistics Database
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(OECD, 2020), is used to give the best estimate of the tax incentives faced by
a firm operating in a country. EMTR is especially well suited for this purpose,
since it measures the income saved by shifting an additional unit of income,
or the marginal utility of income shifting. EMTR is a synthetic tax policy
indicator (Hanappi, 2018), meaning that it differs from the statutory tax rate,
the rate officially imposed on corporate income by the government. OECD
EMTR information is only available for year 2017, which is why statutory tax
rate from the OECD Corporate Tax Statistics Database for each individual
year is used for a robustness check. The statutory tax rate reflects the corpo-
rate income tax rate as expressed in the legislation, and does not necessarily
capture the true tax incentives facing MNEs. Tax rates used in the analysis
are listed in the Appendix (Table A2).
As a source for tariffs faced by Finnish companies by export country and
HS4 product code, I use World Integrated Trade Solution database (IMF,
2019). Information on tariffs is an important factor in determining export
prices, since they affect directly the export costs. It can be assumed, that
arm’s-length prices are higher to destinations with higher tariffs for the given
product, to compensate the tariff losses to the exporting firm and ensuring
that trade is profitable for the exporter. In opposite, intra-firm prices can be
assumed to be lower to destinations with higher tariffs, since the MNEs have
an incentive to avoid tariff costs, which are usually proportional to the value
exported.
4.3 Data set description
Export value of foreign affiliates make a large proportion of the total export
value from Finland in the original data set. Therefore, as I use only exports
by Finnish MNEs and independent firms, 35.5% of the export value is omitted
from the sample. The differences in Finnish and foreign owned MNEs and
firms can be seen in Table 1.
Table 2 presents an overview on the export sample of Finnish firms and
MNEs used further in the analysis. As indicated by the mean of export value,
a single transaction in intra-group is more than double that of the arm’s-
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Table 1: Comparison of foreign affiliate and Finnish MNE and independent
firm exports 2014-2017
Foreign Finnish Total
Number of observations 1,155,900 2,681,587 3,837,487
Mean of log(price) (log(e)) 3.57 3.33 3.40
Sum of export value (billion e) 63.5 115.2 178.7
Mean of export value (e) 54,936 42,995 46,996
Intra-group value (%) 21.4 59,1 46.3
length group. Additionally, the mean of log price gives the first evidence that
intra-firm trade prices are lower than arm’s-length prices. This difference is
not yet suggestive of systematic transfer mispricing, since it may be based
on various differences between the transactions in these two groups. For
example, the intra-group consisting of lesser-quality goods or trade towards
less developed countries could explain the difference. In addition, a single
transaction being more valuable in intra-group could lead to additional unit
costs, such as transport unit costs, being lower for the intra-firm group. To
look for a systematic response of the price groups on destination country
taxation, a more detailed analysis is needed.
Table 2: Summary statistics of prices and export values by export mode,
Finnish MNEs and independent exporters 2014-2017
Control group Intra-firm group Total
Number of observations 1,752,427 929,160 2,681,587
Mean of log(price) (log(e)) 3.51 3.00 3.33
Sum of export value 46.3 68.9 115.2
(billion e)
Mean of export value (e) 26,416 74,149 42,995
Tax Haven value (%) 3.4 1.3 2.1
Figure 3 presents the geographical distribution of intra-firm group exports,
showing the share of intra-group transaction of total exports by destination
country. The greatest proportion of intra-group trade can be found in the
United States and the Netherlands, both of which have a share of intra-
group trade above 80% of the total exports. China and Sweden are other
important export destinations with above 70% share of their exports intra-
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Figure 3: Shares of intra-group trade value per destination country in 2014-
2017, circle size represents total export value of the destination. Only 40 top
destinations by export value presented.
group, whereas less intra-group trade can be observed in Germany and Russia,
where the share of intra-group trade stays below 60%, and the UK, France,
Japan and the rest of the Nordic countries, where the intra-group share is
approximately 40%. Even if the figure does not tell the actual share of intra-
firm trade to these destinations, it may give some hint of where the intra-firm
transactions are more prevalent and, in addition, accurately describes when
an affiliate is present in an export country.
Figure 4: Shares of intra-group trade value by CPA categories, circle size
represents total export value of the CPA category. Explanations of CPA
categories in Appendix (Table A1).
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Figure 4 illustrates the share of intra-group transactions by commodity
type, classified by CPA category. As is the case with export destinations,
intra-group exports show a great variation by commodity type. In general, the
most exported goods tend to also be the most intra-group oriented. Highest
share of intra-group exports can be identified in basic metals (24), paper and
paper products (17) and coke and refined petroleum products (19), where the
intra-group share is 70 - 90% of the total exports. Less intra-group trade can
be identified in computer, electronic and optical products (26) and electrical
equipment (27), where intra-group share is slightly below 60%, and machinery
(28), where intra-group share is around 50%. Motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers (29), chemicals and chemical products (20) and wood and wood
products (16) are exported intra-group in 40% of their value. Products of
agriculture (1) are exported intra group less than 10% of their value. As
an outlier, the small group of Architectural and engineering services (71) is
exported almost 100% intra-firm. However, this category is small in export
value, since it mainly describes services not included in goods exports. Full
description of CPA categories in Figure 4 are listed in the Appendix (Table
A1).
Table 3: Summary statistics of country variables by export mode, Finnish
MNEs and independent exporters 2014-2017.
Control group Intra-firm group Total
Number of observations 1,752,427 929,160 2,681,587
Mean of GDP per capita ($) 25,773 23,915 25,113
Mean of Tax Haven dummy 0.047 0.017 0.036
Mean of Tax rate (EMTR) 7.67 7.27 7.53
Mean of Distance (km) 1,472 1,186 1,366
Mean of Tariff dummy 0.298 0.265 0.287
Table 3 presents means of country variables in the data set. The share of
export transctions to tax havens is 3.6 percent in the total sample, but only
1.7 percent in intra-firm group transactions. It can also be seen that trade in
intra-firm group is more likely to direct to countries with slightly lower GDP
per capita, lower effective marginal tax rate, smaller distance to Finland and
less tariffs imposed to the exported products.
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5 Empirical methods
The empirical methods in this research are mostly based on work by Davies
et al. (2018), which in turn employs very similar methods to other empiri-
cal papers studying transfer mispricing (Clausing, 2003; Bernard et al., 2006;
Vicard, 2015; Liu et al., 2017). At the core of each of these empirical paper,
there is a difference-in-differences model with fixed effects to isolate the dif-
ference between arm’s-length and transfer prices across different tax regimes,
controlled by product, firm and market characteristics.
To start with, export price data is used instead of import price data, since
the former includes information on exporting firm. This information is impor-
tant to distinguish firm dependent characteristics from other sources of price
variation. Information on exporting firm allows to control for productivity
differences between firms and other important factors in production that af-
fect pricing, which makes export price data ideal for identification of transfer
mispricing (Davies et al., 2018).
As discussed in the data section, the biggest difference to the work by
Davies et al. (2018) is that I rely on geographic proxies to identify transfer
prices from arm’s-length prices. Therefore, the interpretation of the results is
not as straightforward and needs to take into account the inaccuracy caused
by the identification strategy. However, as other papers have also used a
similar geographic proxy in their research (Cristea and Nguyen, Cristea and
Nguyen 2016; Hebous and Johannesen, 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Vicard, 2015),
with otherwise very similar methods to Davies et al. (2018), they can be used
to mirror the effects of inaccurate transfer price identification on results.
5.1 Difference-in-differences regression with fixed ef-
fects
The difference-in-differences model used follows the one conducted by Davies
et al. (2018) and can be written:
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ln(Pricefpmct) = α1Intrafpmct (9)
+ α2 ln(1− Taxct) + α3 ln(1− Taxct)× Intrafpmct
+ α4Tax havenc + α5Tax havenc × Intrafpmct
+ α6Countryct + α7Countryct × Intrafpmct
+ µfpm + µt + fpmct
This model is almost similar to the one used by Clausing (eq. (7)), in that
it aims to explain the logarithm of prices with a set of country-dependent
regressors and fixed effects dummy variables using a difference-in-differences
approach for arm’s-length and intra-firm price groups across tax rates in ex-
port countries. Each export price represents a combination of exporting firm,
product type, month and destination country. In this particular model, there
are two types of fixed effect dummies: an individual dummy is assigned for
each year-month pair (µt), and another dummy is assigned for each unique
combination of firm-product-mode (µfpm), where mode stands for intra-firm
and arm’s-length group status. The dummy variables are illustrated in Table 4
and they act as a critical detail to control for time-specific and firm-product-
mode-specific variation in prices. What is left for the country variables to
explain is the variation unrelated to the attributes controlled by the dummy-
variables. For example, in a group of cars exported intra-firm by a firm X, the
observations differ only in their export country after the fixed effect dummies
are used. The price variance of these observations are explained by a set of
country-specific variables, which consist of the tax variable (Taxct), tax haven
dummy (Tax havenc), GDP per capita, distance from Finland in kilometers
and tariffs (Countryct).
Fixed effects regression is often called “within-estimation”, since creating
dummy variables for different groups of observations makes it possible to focus
only on within-group variation (Verbeek, 2017). Creating a dummy variable is
identical to creating a new variable set, in which the mean value of the group
is subtracted from the value of each observation. As a result, differences
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Table 4: Dummy variables used (µfpm, µt)
Year-month Firm-product-mode dummies
dummies (t) (fpm)
2014-1 Firm 1 - Product 1 - Arm’s-length
2014-2 Firm 1 - Product 1 - Intra-firm
Firm 1 - Product 2 - Arm’s-length
... Firm 2 - Product 1 - ...
...
2017-12 Firm 21 980 - Product 7 675 - Intra-firm
N. of dummies 48 205 744
between groups can no longer be compared, since their differences have been
erased. The usual application of fixed effects is the difference-in-differences
model as presented here, where group-dependent individual traits need to
be controlled for to estimate the impact of treatment on one of the groups.
By controlling for group-dependent characteristics, one is able to isolate the
impact of treatment from all other possible sources of variation in differing
outcomes for the two groups.
In this particular fixed effects regression model, variation in differing reac-
tions to the tax rate by the two groups of interest, intra-firm and arm’s-length
trade, are treated with extensive set of dummies so that group-specific traits
are not affecting the estimates for country-specific variables. This is analo-
gous to the traditional difference-in-differences model, in which group-specific
traits do not affect the time-specific estimates, such as effects of treatment
on treatment group. By this formulation, one is able to see if country-specific
attributes, such as tax rate, affect prices, given that the variation between
firms, products, years or months do not bias the results.
To control for unobserved country-specific traits, I follow Davies et al.
(2018) and also use country fixed effects in some of the calculations. By
creating dummy variables for each export country, one is able to ensure that
no country specific trait that is not included in the regression model biases
estimates for export mode specific effects. However, as country fixed effects
are introduced, no country variables that are constant across time can be
introduced to the model, since they are perfectly co-linear with the country
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dummies (Asteriou and Hall, 2015). This includes tax rates, which implies
that with country fixed effects, no estimate for effects of tax rate differences
on prices can be obtained. Despite this drawback of country fixed effects, they
do not cancel out the cross term of intra-firm group and a country variable
– such as tax rate – which derives from the notion that variances of intra-
firm prices and arm’s-length prices can differ within countries. Even if country
fixed effects absorb possible effects of tax rates on the totality of export prices,
the parameter estimate for the cross-term can be obtained, describing if the
intra-firm prices react to tax rates different to prices in general.
5.2 Controlling for arm’s-length price manipulation
As suggested by Cristea and Nguyen (2016), MNEs practicing transfer mis-
pricing may also have incentive to manipulate their arm’s-length prices. Ma-
nipulated arm’s-length prices are used to make the difference to intra-firm
prices look smaller, making it more difficult for the tax authorities to notice
transfer mispricing. The possibility of arm’s-length price manipulation makes
it crucial not to make conclusions on transfer mispricing on a single prod-
uct, exported by a single firm to a single destination. Such identification has
been implemented by Bernard et al. (2006), who calculate a price wedge by
subtracting the “comparable uncontrolled price”, i.e. the closest comparable
arm’s-length price, from the intra-firm price. Unfortunately, as the manipu-
lated transfer price is compared with the closest arm’s-length price set by the
same firm, there is a high probability that the arm’s-length price is also ma-
nipulated by the MNE, which leads to a smaller price wedge underestimating
the true magnitude of transfer mispricing.
In this research, the division of trade observations into categories of intra-
firm and arm’s-length trade is made based on the geographic structure of the
MNEs. Therefore, both the true intra-firm transactions and their closest com-
parable arm’s-length prices are allocated to the same intra-firm group. Due
to this, the intra-firm group contains also false cases of intra-firm trade, which
are the prices most likely manipulated to hide transfer mispricing. Therefore,
arm’s-length prices most likely manipulated are treated equally to transfer
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prices. Most importantly, the arm’s-length prices most likely manipulated
are not allocated to the control group, which would bias the reference group.
To avoid biasing the results with respect to arm’s-length manipulation,
prices set by a firm for a product are compared across each export destina-
tion. The assumption is that arm’s-length manipulation would be the most
probable within the same destination as the intra-firm manipulation, and by
controlling with prices of all the destination countries, the effect of arm’s-
length manipulation can be minimized.
5.3 Standard error clustering and additional models
Data consisting of clustered observations tend to have standard errors corre-
lating within clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015). In my export price data
set, observations are clustered in multiple dimensions, including firm, product
type, year, month and export country. This raises the need to control for stan-
dard error clustering, since failing to do so when needed leads to misleadingly
small standard errors, directly affecting the reliability of confidence intervals
(Cameron and Miller, 2015). Davies et al. (2018) conclude to using standard
error clustering at the country level in their similar data set and explain their
choice to be the most conservative alternative. This means that compared to
clustering standard errors on other dimensions, country level clustering gives
the biggest standard errors and widest confidence intervals.
Other empirical papers using similar data and methods have also clustered
their standard errors on a dimension of their choice. Cristea and Nguyen
(2016) and Bernard et al. (2006) end up clustering at the country-year level,
as do Vicard (2015) and Liu et al. (2017). The use of country-year fixed
effects as opposed to Davies et al. (2018) may be due to the simple fact that
Davies et al. use data for one year only. However, Cameron and Miller (2015)
warn using country-year clustering when price shocks in a country may affect
prices in later periods. Additionally, since by construction country-level has
fewer clusters than country-year-level, country-level gives more conservative
confidence intervals and should be applied as suggested by Cameron and Miller
(2015). However, as previous literature exploiting observations for multiple
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years have chosen country-year-level clustering, I also report results using
country-year clustered standard errors.
5.4 Implementing the analysis
To implement the models discussed above, I use Stata 16.1 and its regression
tools. The most convenient way to deal with regression models with large
amount of dummies in Stata is the areg-function. This command does not
solve the parameter estimates for fixed effects dummy variables, but instead
absorbs them to the model using Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem to gain com-
putational efficiency (McCaffrey et al., 2012). Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
states that a regression model gives the same results for β1 and its confidence
intervals when Q2Y is regressed on Q2X1 instead of Y regressed on both X1
and X2 (Lovell, 2008). For the most simple OLS case, this can be described
as follows
Y = β1X1 + β2X2 + , V ar() = σ2I (10)
Q2 = I −X2(X ′2X2)−1X ′2 (11)
βˆ1 = (X ′1Q2X1)−1X ′1Q2Y (12)
V ar(βˆ1) = σ2(X ′1Q2X1)−1 (13)
The estimation method above can be interpreted as X2 being the fixed
effects constant for each firm-product-mode group which, using the dummy
variable method, would have to be expanded to comprise of an additional
variable set of up to 200,000+ dummies. Using Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem,
the same results for β1 can be obtained with significantly less computational
resources.
To ensure that also the standard errors are identical to the dummy variable
regression, areg-function calculates the degrees of freedom using the amount
of variables in the original dummy variable data set instead of the within
transformation data used to calculate the point estimates. Clustering the
standard errors with areg-function is documented to require that the clusters
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do not increase with the sample size (McCaffrey et al., 2012). With country
and country-year clusters, this can be assumed to hold true, since the number
of export countries is fixed and does not increase by the sample size. To
conclude, unlike in the simplest OLS example above (eq. (10) – (13)), within
decomposition does not require error terms to be constant, and the residuals
generated are identical to those of the original dummy variable regression
(Lovell, 2008).
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6 Results
In this section, I go through all the results for Equation 9 with altering details
in the model and data used. First, in Section 6.1, the full export data set
is analyzed, and in Section 6.2, additional firm, product and country-specific
sub-samples are analyzed. As a robustness check in section 6.3, I present
an alternative tax variable and check whether omitting temporal variation
of the tax variables used causes bias in the results. Lastly, the back-of-the-
envelope calculations in Section 6.4 present calculations for impacts of transfer
mispricing deductible from the main results.
6.1 Main results
The results of the regression model described in Equation 9 using the full
export data set are presented in Table 5. Each column incorporates slight
variations to the basic model concerning sample size, country variables and
fixed effects. In each column, the tax rate (Taxc) used to calculate the re-
gressor variable ln(1 − Taxc) is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) of
the export destination country in 2017. By transforming the EMTR variable
by taking the logarithm of 1 − Taxc allows to interpret the estimated pa-
rameters more conveniently. With a parameter estimate αˆ2 (Eq. 9), a one
percent change in EMTR indicates −αˆ2 percentage change in export prices.
For other country-variables with logarithm transformation (GDP per capita
and Distance), a one percent change in the variable indicates αˆ61 and αˆ62
percent change in export prices, and for dummy variables (Tax Haven, Tariff)
changing the class from 0 to 1 results in αˆ4 and αˆ63 percent change in export
prices. The parameter estimates for the cross-terms with intra-firm group
dummy are interpreted equally. When the value of Tax Haven dummy is one,
the destination country is classified as a tax haven, and when Tariff dummy
is 1, the product in destination country is subject to tariffs.
In the first column (1) of Table 5, all other country variables except tax rate
are omitted from the model. The results suggest that EMTR has no significant
effect on arm’s-length prices. However, the coefficient for the interaction
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Table 5: Main Regression Results
Dependent variable: ln(ExportPricefpmct)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(1− Taxc) -0.029 0.014 0.014 0.013
(0.040) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
[0.022] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
−× Intrafpmct -0.122 -0.121 -0.130 -0.132 -0.115
(0.074) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.074)
[0.048]** [0.050]** [0.050]** [0.050]*** [0.046]**
TaxHavenc 0.005 0.005
(0.014) (0.014)
[0.009] [0.008]
−× Intrafpmct 0.066 0.073 0.058
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063)
[0.041] [0.041]* [0.041]
GDPPercapitac 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
−× Intrafpmct -0.005 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Distancec 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
−× Intrafpmct -0.016 -0.016 -0.020 -0.024 -0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)* (0.012)
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]*** [0.007]
Tariffc 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.020
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
[0.010]* [0.011]* [0.011]* [0.012]*
−× Intrafpmct 0.016 0.028 0.022 0.028 0.017
(0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021]
Sample Full Full Full Full - Tax H. Full
Country FE No No No No No Yes
F-P-M FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,681,587 2,681,587 2,681,587 2,681,587 2,584,462 2,681,587
Adjusted R2 0.8691 0.8691 0.8691 0.8691 0.8701 0.8693
This table investigates effective marginal tax rate, tax haven status, GDP per capita, dis-
tance and tariff effects on arm’s-length and intra-firm export prices. In column 5 tax haven
observations are omitted, and in column 6 country fixed effects are included. Standard er-
rors are presented both clustered at the country level (parentheses) and at the country-year
level [brackets]. Significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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between the intra-firm group dummy and the tax rate shows a negative effect,
which is significant with the more relaxed standard error clustering method. It
suggests that a 10% decrease in EMTR leads to 1.2% lower intra-firm group
prices. However, this result is not significant with the more conservative
standard error clustering at the country-level.
In the second column (2) of Table 5, more country variables are included in
the model to control for bias caused by differing market conditions across des-
tination countries. The results for coefficients of the tax variable remain very
similar to those in the smaller model. The effect of tax rate on arm’s-length
prices remains non-significant, and the point estimate as well as significance
levels for the interaction term remain the same. This suggests that the coun-
try variables controlling for the differing market characteristics across desti-
nations do not bias the results in the simple regression of column (1) where
they are omitted. However, it can be seen that there is a very significant
effect of GDP per capita of the destination country on export prices, showing
that 10% increase in destination GDP per capita increases export prices by
0.3 percent. Effects of destination distance on intra-firm prices, as well as
tariffs on all export prices are only significant at the more relaxed standard
error clustering at the country-year level.
In column (3) of Table 5, a dummy variable for the tax haven status
of the destination country is introduced, while all other country variables
are included except the tax rate variable. This model suggests that when
market characteristics are controlled for, arm’s-length prices in tax havens do
not differ from other countries, and neither do intra-firm prices. The point
estimate for intra-firm prices is estimated to be up to 6.6% higher in tax
havens. This result, even though not significant, would suggest that MNEs do
not shift profit to tax havens by transfer mispricing, since it would require the
prices to be lower for tax haven destinations. Given the confidence intervals
for the most conservative standard errors, this result indicates that at the
lowest level of 95% confidence interval, intra-firm group prices could be up to
6.4% lower to tax havens, indicating that despite the opposite point estimate,
transfer mispricing to tax havens could occur.
In column (4) of Table 5, all of the country variables are included in the
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same model to compare the interaction between tax rate variable and tax
haven dummies. The results change only slightly, showing that the point
estimate for the cross term of the tax rate coefficient and intra-firm group
dummy is slightly lower than without introducing the tax haven dummy,
and the point estimate for the cross term of the tax haven coefficient and
intra-firm group dummy is slightly larger than without tax rate variable in
the model, causing it to become significant in the lowest level of the more
relaxed standard error clustering. In addition, effects on arm’s-length prices
remain non-significant for both variables. Nevertheless, these changes are only
minor, suggesting that no significant bias is occurring on either variable when
the other one is omitted.
Column (5) of Table 5 investigates regression results when exports to tax
havens are omitted from the sample. Other than the tax haven dummy,
all other country variables are included in the model, including the tax rate
variable. No significant changes in the resulting parameters can be observed.
However, the cross term coefficient of the tax rate variable and intra-firm
group dummy moves to the most significant level in the relaxed standard
error clustering method, suggesting that in the data set, the intra-firm group
prices to low-tax tax haven countries tend to be higher than to other low-tax
countries.
Lastly, Column (6) of Table 5 presents the model with country dummies.
Since this makes the direct effects of the country variables impossible to ana-
lyze, capturing only the effects caused by the mild temporal changes in GDP
per capita, they are omitted from the model. As a benefit, country dummies
can be used to control for all other country-specific characteristics that are
not included in the country variable set, which helps in assessing the robust-
ness of the results. It can be seen that this model gives roughly the same
point estimates for the interaction terms of the tax variables, and identical to
other model specifications, does not consider them significant with the strict
standard error clustering method. However, the interaction coefficient for
tax rate remains significant with the more liberal standard error clustering
method. Therefore, one can conclude that omitted country variables do not
bias the results for the cross term of the tax variable and intra-firm group
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dummy in other model specifications. However, the cross term of distance
and intra-firm group dummy loses its significance with both standard error
clustering methods.
As a conclusion, the main results do not find clear significant evidence
of transfer mispricing, since no result for tax variables is significant with the
strictest standard error clustering method. However, as previous research
using panel data have applied the more liberal standard error clustering, it
may be more suitable to deal with standard error correlation in export data,
and gives results that are comparable with the previous literature. With such
a method, intra-firm group prices are estimated to decrease 1.2-1.3% for each
10% decrease of tax rate in the destination country.
6.2 Additional results
As shown in the theory section (2.1), MNEs exporting large quantities are
expected to have increased incentive for transfer mispricing. Therefore, fo-
cusing on the top 5% of exporting MNEs in the sample and leaving all purely
domestic exporters in the data set allows assessing whether MNEs exporting
large quantities tend to price their intra-firm trade different to the total ex-
porter population. In addition, theory suggests that differentiated products
can more easily be used to transfer mispricing, since defining reference prices
for them is harder than for homogeneous goods. Therefore, I use the prod-
uct classification by Rauch (1999) to distinguish differentiated products and
run the analysis with them only. Additionally, I present results by dividing
the data set into EU customs union countries and non-EU customs union
countries. The results for these smaller samples are presented in Table 6 and
Table 7, including cases for less exporting MNEs omitted from the alterna-
tive specification and homogeneous and reference priced goods in contrast for
differentiated goods.
For the top 5% of the exporting MNEs, accounting for up to 87% of the
total MNE export value in the sample, the results indicate higher significance
for transfer mispricing than for full sample in Table 5. In columns (1) and
(2) in Table 6, results show that when destination tax rate decreases 10%,
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Table 6: Additional Regression Results: Firm Size and Product Type
Dependent variable: ln(ExportPricefpmct)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(1− Taxc) 0.037 0.006 0.045
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030)
[0.021]* [0.019] [0.020]**
−× Intrafpmct -0.148 -0.140 -0.184 -0.188 -0.186 -0.155
(0.085)* (0.082)* (0.132) (0.135) (0.096)* (0.091)*
[0.055]*** [0.050]*** [0.089]** [0.096]* [0.066]*** [0.061]**
TaxHavenc 0.006 0.015 -0.003
(0.022) (0.016) (0.020)
[0.013] [0.009] [0.012]
−× Intrafpmct 0.058 0.041 0.237 0.209 0.048 0.029
(0.071) (0.071) (0.058)*** (0.052)*** (0.075) (0.069)
[0.046] [0.047] [0.072]*** [0.071]*** [0.054] [0.053]
GDPPercapitac 0.025 0.027 0.030
(0.013)* (0.011)** (0.008)***
[0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]***
−× Intrafpmct -0.017 -0.012 0.050 0.033 -0.011 -0.004
(0.016) (0.017) (0.027)* (0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
[0.010]* [0.010] [0.020]** [0.022] [0.010] [0.010]
Distancec -0.016 0.001 0.010
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
[0.008]** [0.007] [0.006]*
−× Intrafpmct 0.004 0.007 -0.026 -0.027 -0.056 -0.046
(0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014)*** (0.014)***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.014]* [0.014]* [0.009]*** [0.009]***
Tariffc 0.032 0.030 0.008
(0.028) (0.026) (0.021)
[0.015]** [0.014]** [0.012]
−× Intrafpmct -0.027 -0.018 0.163 0.132 0.077 0.066
(0.035) (0.040) (0.088)* (0.083) (0.040)* (0.038)*
[0.021] [0.023] [0.053]*** [0.049]*** [0.025]*** [0.024]***
Sample Big Big Small Small Diff. Diff.
MNEs MNEs MNEs MNEs Goods Goods
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-P-M FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,725,963 1,725,963 1,804,018 1,629,468 1,629.468 1,629,468
Adjusted R2 0.8686 0.8689 0.8635 0.8637 0.8572 0.8574
This table investigates effective marginal tax rate, tax haven status, GDP per capita,
distance and tariff effects on arm’s-length and intra-firm export prices. In columns 1 and
2, sample consists of only big MNEs and all domestic firms, and in columns 3 and 4,
sample consists of only small MNEs and all domestic firms. Columns 5 and 6 include
only differentiated goods. Standard errors are presented both clustered at the country
level (parentheses) and at the country-year level [brackets]. Significance levels: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Additional Regression Results: Product Type and Geography
Dependent variable: ln(ExportPricefpmct)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(1− Taxc) -0.022 -0.022 0.028
(0.036) (0.032) (0.069)
[0.027] [0.018] [0.046]
−× Intrafpmct -0.083 -0.110 -0.071 -0.048 -0.260 -0.208
(0.065) (0.056)* (0.064) (0.066) (0.149)* (0.147)
[0.051] [0.047]** [0.042]* [0.042] [0.113]** [0.110]*
TaxHavenc -0.010 -0.016 0.034
(0.026) (0.017) (0.012)***
[0.017] [0.011] [0.010]***
−× Intrafpmct 0.098 0.100 0.131 0.125 0.011 0.017
(0.053)* (0.049)** (0.101) (0.097) (0.073) (0.079)
[0.034]*** [0.038]*** [0.079] [0.077] [0.045] [0.048]
GDPPercapitac 0.034 0.036 0.030
(0.009)*** (0.016)** (0.011)**
[0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.007]***
−× Intrafpmct -0.012 -0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.049 -0.040
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)*** (0.019)**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011]*** [0.012]***
Distancec 0.010 -0.001 0.012
(0.009) (0.018) (0.007)*
[0.006]* [0.010] [0.005]**
−× Intrafpmct -0.002 0.000 -0.025 -0.019 -0.014 -0.016
(0.010) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
[0.007] [0.007] [0.012]** [0.012] [0.015] [0.016]
Tariffc 0.047 0.062 0.021
(0.022)** (0.035)* (0.020)
[0.014]*** [0.019]*** [0.012]*
−× Intrafpmct -0.023 -0.032 -0.040 -0.029 -0.048 -0.010
(0.029) (0.022) (0.043) (0.037) (0.042) (0.054)
[0.022] [0.019] [0.028] [0.026] [0.030] [0.033]
Sample Homog. Homog. EU EU non-EU non-EU
Goods Goods
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-P-M FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 390,006 390,006 1,665,171 1,665,171 1,016,416 1,016,416
Adjusted R2 0.9118 0.9119 0.8778 0.8780 0.8668 0.8670
This table investigates effective marginal tax rate, tax haven status, GDP per capita,
distance and tariff effects on arm’s-length and intra-firm export prices. Columns 1 and 2
include only homogeneous and reference priced goods. In columns 3 and 4, sample consists
of only exports to countries in the EU customs union, and in columns 5 and 6, the sample
consists of only exports to countries not in EU customs union. Standard errors are presented
both clustered at the country level (parentheses) and at the country-year level [brackets].
Significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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big MNEs price their intra-group trade 1.4 to 1.5 percent lower. This result
is weakly significant with the strict standard error clustering and highly sig-
nificant with the more relaxed standard error clustering. The point estimate
is only slightly larger than in the main results with the full MNE sample, but
due to the difference in their significance levels, big MNEs can more com-
fortably be said to practice transfer mispricing relative to the total exporting
MNE population.
In columns (3) and (4) in Table 6, similar analysis has been made for
the lower 95% of the exporting MNEs. Curiously, the point estimate for
the cross term of tax rate and intra-firm group dummy would indicate larger
transfer mispricing for less exporting MNEs, but due to less significance in
these results, small MNEs cannot be said to practice transfer mispricing for
certain. However, by comparing the results for big and small exporters, it
is controversial whether large exporters are more prone to higher volumes of
transfer mispricing than smaller exporters, even if their transfer mispricing is
statistically significant.
Smaller MNEs have especially large intra-firm group export prices to tax
havens, up to 2.1-2.4 percent higher than comparable arm’s-length prices.
This controversial result may be due to low amount of small MNE exports
to tax havens. However, this result is strongly significant. In addition, less
exporting MNEs seem to react different to tariffs compared to larger MNEs,
increasing their intra-firm group export prices by 1.3-1.6 percent when tariffs
are present. This is in contradiction to the hypothesis that MNEs try to avoid
paying more tariffs by pricing their intra-firm trade lower than market prices
when tariffs are present.
In columns (5) and (6) in Table 6, only differentiated goods are kept in
the sample. As a result, it is estimated that a 10% decrease in destination tax
rate leads to 1.6 to 1.9% lower intra-firm export prices for differentiated goods.
These results are weakly significant for the more conservative standard error
clustering and highly significant for the more relaxed standard error cluster-
ing. This suggests that differentiated goods are used for transfer mispricing.
Curiously, the most significant coefficient in the results shows that intra-firm
prices are 0.5 to 0.6% lower for each 10% increase in the destination distance.
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There is also weaker evidence that intra-firm prices are 0.7 to 0.8% higher
when the product is subject to tariffs in the destination country.
In columns (1) and (2) in Table 7, similar analysis is made for homogeneous
and reference priced goods. Comparing to differentiated goods, the estimates
for the cross term of tax rate and intra-firm group dummy are lower and
lose significance in the model which does not include country fixed effects.
Therefore, it can be assumed that homogeneous and reference priced goods are
used less for transfer mispricing that differentiated goods. In addition, unlike
differentiated goods, homogeneous and reference priced goods react to tariffs
by increasing their overall prices by 0.5 percent when they are present. Their
intra-firm group prices do not react to distance and tariffs as differentiated
intra-firm group prices do.
In columns (3) and (4) in Table 7, only exports to countries in the EU cus-
toms union are included and, respectively, only non-EU custom union coun-
tries are included in the sample in columns (5) and (6). The results show that
the exports inside the EU customs union do not exhibit transfer mispricing
practices, since significance levels for the cross terms of tax rate and intra-
firm group dummy are even lower than in the full sample and, in addition,
their point estimates are much lower. On the contrary, a large point estimate
for tax rate effects on transfer prices can be observed for non-EU custom
union countries, suggesting that a 10% decrease in the destination country
tax rate decreases intra-firm export prices up to 2.1 to 2.6 percent. This re-
sult is weakly significant with the more conservative standard error clustering,
but when introduced with country fixed effects, loses significance in the more
conservative standard error clustering. Despite limited significance levels for
non-EU customs union countries, the data would suggest that export prices
outside the EU customs union exhibit more transfer mispricing compared to
exports within the EU customs union.
6.3 Robustness checks
In this section, I present further results using statutory tax rate as the tax
rate variable, and compare whether results omitting temporal variation of the
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tax rate variable differ from those received using accurate tax rate data. This
is done because the main analyses have been made with EMTR tax variable
for one year only due to data availability. This may result in lower accuracy
when compared to the more realistic case, in which tax rates fluctuate yearly
due to policy shifts.
The statutory tax rate in Finland is constant for each year in the period
spanning from 2014 to 2017, suggesting that also the EMTR variable for
Finland would stay relatively constant over time. However, there are striking
differences in absolute levels of statutory tax rates and EMTRs, which may
indicate that they do not always move to the same direction. The statutory
tax rates and EMTRs can be seen in the Appendix (Table A2).
In addition to differences in their levels, statutory tax rate and EMTR give
considerably differing results when plugged to the regression model, as can
be seen by comparing results using EMTR in column (2) in Table 5 to results
using statutory tax rates in column (1) in Table 8. Whereas EMTR results
indicate possibility for lower intra-firm prices with decreasing EMTR and
no tax rate effect on arm’s-length prices, statutory tax rate results indicate
the opposite. A 10% decrease in destination statutory tax rate results in
1.0% increase in arm’s-length prices, which is only significant using the liberal
standard error clustering. Statutory tax rate has no significant effect on intra-
firm prices. Given this result, statutory tax rate can be interpreted to describe
less the tax incentives faced by MNEs and more the market conditions in the
destination country, affecting each exporting firm regardless of export mode.
When comparing the regression with the real statutory tax rate for each
year (column (1) Table 8) to using statutory tax rate for year 2017 for each
observation in the sample (column (2) Table 8), the results look very simi-
lar, with slight changes in estimated parameter values and some changes in
significance levels. This result can be interpreted that for statutory tax rate,
omitting temporal variance does not cause any significant bias to the results,
even if the less accurate 2017 tax rate gives higher significance for the tax
rate coefficient. If believed that EMTR behaves similar to the statutory tax
rate, it can be argued that no large bias is introduced in the results by using
EMTR for year 2017 as an approximate for every year in the sample.
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Table 8: Regression Results for Statutory Tax Rate
Dependent variable: ln(ExportPricefpmct)
(1) (2))
ln(1− Taxc) 0.099 0.107
(0.068) (0.063)*
[0.037]*** [0.034]***
−× Intrafpmct -0.057 -0.084
(0.109) (0.097)
[0.070] [0.060]
GDPPercapitac 0.029 0.029
(0.008)*** (0.008)***
[0.005]*** [0.005]***
−× Intrafpmct 0.000 -0.000
(0.013) (0.013)
[0.009] [0.009]
Distancec 0.008 0.009
(0.008) (0.007)
[0.004]* [0.004]**
−× Intrafpmct -0.015 -0.017
(0.015) (0.015)
[0.008]* [0.008]**
Tariffc 0.018 0.017
(0.017) (0.016)
[0.010]* [0.009]*
−× Intrafpmct 0.022 0.022
(0.038) (0.038)
[0.022] [0.022]
Sample Full Full
Country FE No No
F-P-M FE Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes
Observations 2,681,587 2,681,587
Adjusted R2 0.8691 0.8691
This table investigates statutory tax rate, GDP per capita, distance and tariff effects on
arm’s-length and intra-firm export prices. In column 1, statutory tax rate for years 2014-
2017 is used. In column2, statutory tax rate for year 2017 is used for all years in the sample.
Standard errors are presented both clustered at the country level (parentheses) and at the
country-year level [brackets]. Significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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6.4 Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations
The estimates calculated for the magnitude of transfer mispricing can be
further used to describe the amount of underreported exports and, eventually,
corporate tax revenues lost by the government due to these underreported
exports. The formula for total shifted profits (Liu et al., 2017) can be stated
as
∑
c
α3 × ∆(EMTR)cEMTRFIN ×Xc (14)
where αˆ3 is the estimated coefficient in Table 5 column (2) for tax rate and
intra-firm group dummy, ∆(EMTR)c/EMTRFIN is the percent difference of
the destination EMTR compared to EMTR in Finland, and Xc are the total
values of intra-firm group exports to each destination country. With this
simple algebra, an estimate for the total under and overreported values can
be calculated accounting for destinations with higher and lower EMTRs than
Finland. However, it is good to be aware of the limitations of such an exercise.
Firstly, it is assumed that high and low value intra-firm exports react equally
to the tax rate differences, which is questioned by theory suggesting that high
value transactions react more on tax rate differences. Secondly, as seen in
the regression results, coefficient αˆ3 has very large confidence intervals in all
model specifications. In particular, this coefficient is non-significant with the
conservative standard error clustering in the full sample. Nevertheless, this
point estimate αˆ3 is the best guess for transfer mispricing among all values
within the confidence interval.
For countries with lower EMTR than Finland, the total profit shifted can
be estimated to be 1.10 billion euros in 2017. This means that total exports
to low tax countries would be 1.10 billion euros more if transfer mispricing
did not exist. Equally, for countries with higher EMTR than Finland, the
total profit shifted can be estimated to be 0.30 billion euros in 2017. This
means that total exports to high tax countries would be 0.30 billion euros less
if transfer mispricing did not exist. In total, this sums up to 0.80 billion euros
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of underreported total exports, which is 2.4% of the total value of exports by
Finnish MNEs and firms in 2017. However, it is good to remember the wide
confidence intervals of coefficient αˆ3, which do not cancel out the possibility
of underreported exports to be nonexistent or even considerably higher.
An equally simple calculation can be made to estimate the corporate tax
revenues lost due to these underreported exports. With the Finnish corporate
tax rate of 20%, it can be estimated that the government lost 160 million
euros in 2017 due to transfer mispricing. However, as is the case with total
underreported export volume, this figure could also be close to zero due to the
large confidence intervals of the coefficient αˆ3 or, respectively, considerably
higher.
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7 Discussion
The findings in this research give suggestive evidence of transfer mispricing in
Finnish MNEs. However, no result on transfer mispricing is significant in the
5% significance level when the most conservative standard error clustering
method is applied, which is not enough to reject the null hypothesis of no
transfer mispricing. Despite such an outcome, the point estimates for export
price elasticity on destination tax rate can be interpreted as the best guess for
the true value of the coefficient within the confidence intervals. In addition,
the evidence is statistically significant when similar standard error clustering
is used as in most of the previous literature. With relaxed clustering, intra-
firm export prices are found to be in general 1.2% lower, intra-firm export
prices by top 5% of exporting MNEs 1.4% lower and intra-firm export prices
of differentiated products 1.6% lower for each 10% reduction in destination
tax rate.
The reason for not rejecting the null hypothesis relies largely on my de-
cision of standard error clustering, which is stricter than used by most of
the previous literature with similar data and methods. Cameron and Miller
(2015) warn using county-year clustering when price shocks in a country may
affect prices in later periods. Additionally, they encourage to choose the fewest
clusters possible, since they usually make confidence intervals wider and more
robust. However, previous research has mainly relied on country-year level
standard error clustering on their export price data, which is why I also report
the results with such level of clustering.
I list estimates obtained in previous studies in Table 9 for comparison, and
to illustrate the differences in methods used. The estimates vary in nature,
with most of them representing semi-elasticity of export prices on tax rate,
an effect of a percentage point change in tax rate on export prices. My results
represent the elasticity of export prices on tax rate, an effect of percent change
in tax rate on export prices. The tax rate variable used in different studies
varies, with many using statutory tax rates instead of effective tax rates. In
addition, the only paper which applies equally strict standard error clustering
is that of Davies et al. (2018), who use country-level standard error clustering.
49
Table 9: Comparison of literature
Sample Elasticity Semi-elasticity Underreported
Exports / year
My results Finland -1.2, (-1.2*) 0.8 bn (e)
2014 - 2017
Davies et al. (2018) France -1.2, (-1.2) 1 bn (e)
2018
Vicard (2015) France (-2.2*) 4.6 bn ($)
2007 - 2009
Liu et al. (2017) UK (-30*) 0.8 bn (£)
2005 - 2011
Bernard et al. (2006) US (-6.6*) 1.9 bn ($)
1993 -2000
Cristea et al. (2016) Denmark (-9.1*) 0.14 bn ($)
1999 - 2006
Clausing (2003) US (-18*)
1997 - 1999
Estimated decreases in intra-firm export prices by either 10% decrease in destination tax
rate (elasticity) or 10 percentage point decrease in destination tax rate (semi-elasticity).
Results with standard errors clustered at country-level without parentheses, and clustered
at country-year-level in parentheses. Significance of results indicated by *.
However, their sample consists of one year only, and therefore no distinction
can be made between clustering at country and country-year level, since they
produce identical clusters and results.
Davies et al. (2018) do not find significant evidence on French export
prices depending on destination tax rate when tax haven status is controlled
for. A striking difference in their results compared to mine is that transfer
mispricing is mainly observed in tax havens, with intra-firm prices up to 11%
lower than arm’s-length prices in tax havens. This is in stark contrast with
my results from Finland, which find significant evidence of higher intra-firm
export prices to tax havens by small MNEs and homogeneous goods. There
are many possible hypotheses that can be made to explain these differences.
Firstly, the transfer mispricing practices cannot be expected to be entirely
similar for French MNEs in 1999 and Finnish MNEs in 2014 to 2017, due to
different export profiles and tax policies. As an example of a difference in
policies, French firms are subject to greater tax rates in both time periods,
and transfer mispricing regulation may have been very different for the two
countries in the two time periods. An alternative explanation can be found in
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the close proximity of two major tax havens, Switzerland and Ireland, which
act as major export destinations for French firms, which Davies et al. (2018)
identify as the key destinations for transfer mispricing. On the contrary,
Finland is in no close proximity to any tax haven as classified by Hines and
Rice (1994), and does not have a significant proportion of exports to any of
them. Finally, there are differences in data quality in the form of identification
of arm’s-length and intra-firm transactions.
Instead, the results for intra-firm export price elasticity on destination ef-
fective marginal tax rate yield very similar results. Davies et al. (2018) find
that at the 10% significance level, 10% lower tax rate leads to 1.2% lower
intra-firm export prices in general and 1.2% lower intra-firm export prices of
differentiated goods. Respectively, I find non-significant but suggestive evi-
dence that 10% lower tax rate leads to 1.2% lower intra-firm export prices.
Even if neither result is significant, they yield estimates of very similar mag-
nitudes.
Comparing to other studies is much more difficult due to different inter-
pretation of their key estimates. Vicard (2015) obtains an estimate of 2.2%
decrease in intra-firm export prices for every 10 percentage point decrease
in destination tax rate. Liu et al. (2017) end up with an estimate of 30%
decrease of intra-firm prices for every 10 percentage point decrease in desina-
tion tax rate. This result is considerably larger than for other papers. In
line with my results, Liu et al. (2017) conclude that tax havens are not spe-
cially attractive to transfer mispricing for UK multinationals, but instead the
amount of it is mostly directed towards other low-tax countries. What Liu et
al. (2017) find as an explanation for this is that trade volumes to tax havens
by British MNEs are proportionally small, which may also explain results for
Finnish data. Bernard et al. (2006) also estimate higher transfer mispricing
results, a decrease of 6.6% in intra-firm prices for every 10 percentage point
decrease in destination tax rate. The papers by Cristea and Nguyen (2016)
and Clausing (2003), using slightly differing methods and data, estimate 9.1
and 18% decrease in intra-firm prices for every 10 percentage point decrease
in destination tax rate.
When comparing the estimates for underreported exports per year, my
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results can be seen to imply a larger volume of profits shifted by manipu-
lated transfer prices than previous research. The result of 0.8 billion e of
underreported exports per year is roughly in the same level as for much big-
ger economies, such as the UK and France, which can be seen to indicate a
proportionally larger share of shifted profits in relation to total export volume
and size of the economy. However, given the previous estimates of Finnish
corporate tax losses by profit shifting as reviewed by Lumme and Ropponen
(2020) ranging from -0.07 to 1 billion euros, my estimate of 0.16 billion euros
of tax losses by export transfer mispricing is of similar magnitude. However,
considering that even though transfer mispricing may be the most prevalent
profit shifting method for Finnish MNEs, as suggested by Viertola (2019), it
represents only a proportion of the totality of profits shifted, unlike numbers
presented by Lumme and Ropponen (2020).
To conclude, estimates that I have obtained for transfer mispricing are
in the spectrum of previous literature, and considering that the results are
non-significant when the standard errors are treated the most conservative,
there seems to be controversial evidence for transfer mispricing. The wide
confidence intervals obtained for transfer mispricing leave room for significant
amount of profit shifting by Finnish MNEs. However, given that foreign
affiliates in Finland are not included in my sample, and that transfer prices are
inaccurately identified from independent trade to countries with dependencies,
it is possible to improve the estimates in future research. Future research
might be interested in identifying transfer prices more accurately, and finding
ways to study the role of foreign affiliates in Finnish transfer mispricing. By
using more detailed data from dependencies on transaction level, more precise
estimates for transfer mispricing could be achieved, as well as more reliable
estimates for the scale of underreported exports.
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8 Conclusions
Transfer pricing is considered a major channel for profit shifting by contempo-
rary multinational enterprises. Despite advanced theoretical modeling of firm
incentives and increasing interest for regulation by policy makers globally,
empirical evidence of transfer mispricing has remained scarce, mostly due to
data limitations. Lately, research providing empirical evidence have started
to emerge. These evidence show that profit shifting by manipulating export
prices does occur, and that it biases national accounts and global trade prices,
decreases corporate taxable income and erodes tax base.
This research has aimed to estimate the magnitude of transfer mispricing
for Finnish MNEs by using detailed data of Finnish exports and their prices
and methods that have been developed in recent empirical research. I find no
conclusive evidence of transfer mispricing, yet the range of confidence intervals
is suggestive of large amounts of profit shifted to low-tax countries. The point
estimate of 1.2% decrease in intra-firm export prices for each 10% decrease
in destination effective marginal tax rate yields an estimate of 0.8 billion
euros of underreported exports in 2017, meaning corporate tax losses of 160
million euros. Due to wide confidence intervals, the reality of profit shifting by
transfer pricing could be nonexistent or substantially larger than estimated.
However, by implementing the more liberal methods which are applied in
previous empirical research, these results become statistically significant, in
addition to further results suggesting increased transfer mispricing in large
exporters and differentiated products.
While the estimates obtained do not provide accurate interpretation for
the magnitude of transfer mispricing, they are the first and so far the only
estimates describing transfer mispricing in Finland obtained using detailed
and comprehensive data of Finnish export prices. In the future, more accu-
rate estimates for transfer mispricing, possible export value biases and tax
losses may be obtained by better identification of arm’s-length and intra-firm
transactions. The data should also include information on exports by foreign
multinational enterprises operating in Finland to describe the total effects of
transfer price manipulation on the Finnish economy.
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A Appendix
Table A1: CPA product classification
CPA Description
01 Products of agriculture, hunting and related services
02 Products of forestry, logging and related services
03 Fish and other fishing products; aquaculture products; support
services to fishing
05 Coal and lignite
06 Crude petroleum and natural gas
07 Metal ores
08 Other mining and quarrying products
10 Food products
11 Beverages
12 Tobacco products
13 Textiles
14 Wearing apparel
15 Leather and related products
16 Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles
of straw and plaiting materials
17 Paper and paper products
18 Printing and recording services
19 Coke and refined petroleum products
20 Chemicals and chemical products
21 Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Rubber and plastic products
23 Other non-metallic mineral products
24 Basic metals
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Computer, electronic and optical products
27 Electrical equipment
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Other transport equipment
31 Furniture
32 Other manufactured goods
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
Descriptions for 2-digit CPA-classification. Source: Eurostat.
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Table A1 Continued: CPA product classification
CPA Description
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal services; materials re-
covery services
58 Publishing services
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production ser-
vices, sound recording and music publishing
71 Architectural and engineering services; technical testing and anal-
ysis services
75 Veterinary services
90 Creative, arts and entertainment services
91 Library, archive, museum and other cultural services
96 Other personal services
XX Unknown product class
Descriptions for 2-digit CPA-classification. Source: Eurostat.
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Table A2: Table of Tax Rates in 2017
EMTR Stat EMTR Stat
Belgium -46.9 34.0 Netherlands 9.7 25.0
India -32.0 47.9 Singapore* 9.8 17.0
Italy -17.5 27.8 Russia 9.8 20.0
Brazil -6.0 34.0 Canada 9.8 26.7
Liechtenstein* -4.4 12.5 Germany 9.9 29.8
Papua New Guinea -2.6 - Slovenia 10.3 19.0
Estonia 0 20.0 Curacao 10.3 22.0
Br. Virgin Islands* 0 0 Senegal 10.4 32.5
Cayman Islands* 0 0 Portugal 10.7 29.5
Saudi Arabia 0 0 Iceland 10.9 20.0
Turks and Caicos* 0 0 Albania 10.9 -
Croatia 0 18.0 Finland 11.4 20.0
Kenya 0.9 30.0 Jamaica 11.7 25.0
Andorra* 1.4 10.0 China 12.6 25.0
Denmark 2.3 22.0 Austria 13.7 25.0
Lithuania 2.7 15.0 Seychelles 13.9 30.0
Hungary 2.8 9.0 France 14.0 44.4
Bulgaria 4.0 10.0 Israel 14.1 24.0
Latvia 4.1 15.0 New Zealand 15.5 28.0
Indonesia 4.4 25.0 Peru 15.8 29.5
Romania 5.2 16.0 Norway 16.0 24.0
D. R. Congo 5.3 35.0 Greece 16.3 29.0
Hong Kong* 6.7 16.5 Malta* 16.6 35.0
Luxembourg* 6.8 27.1 United States 17.3 38.9
Korea 7.0 24.2 Spain 17.3 25.0
Ireland* 7.5 12.5 United Kingdom 17.4 19.0
Mauritius 7.5 15.0 Thailand 17.4 20.0
Mexico 7.7 30.0 Turkey 18.0 20.0
Macao* 7.9 12.0 Slovak Republic 18.6 21.0
Cyprus* 8.0 12.5 Czech Republic 23.3 19.0
Sweden 8.4 22.0 Botswana 24.5 22.0
Poland 9.0 19.0 Argentina 26.9 35.0
Switzerland* 9.1 21.1 Australia 28.5 30.0
South Africa 9.4 28.0 Chile 31.3 25.0
Japan 9.5 30.0 Costa Rica 33.1 -
Effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and Statutory tax rate (Stat) in 2017. Tax havens by
Hines and Rice (1994) marked by *. Source: OECD Corporate Tax Statistics Database
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